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Abstract. The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological 
monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on 
experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German 
idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement 
concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is identical with 
the method of natural science; (T2) The method of psychology is inspired by the 
method of natural science. The thesis of this study is that an important part of 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is elaborated in accordance with T1. By 
contrast, Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology illustrates the subsequent decision to 
give up this idea. In its place, the aforementioned requirement is elaborated in the 
spirit of a methodological particularism that recommends the scientist elaborate his 
methods according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to the 
difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It is common knowledge that, with respect to methodology, Brentano advocated an 
approach that held that both natural and mental science should share the same 
method, the method of the natural sciences. In that respect, in his fourth habilitation 
thesis at the University of Würzburg in 1867, he clearly maintained: “The true method 
of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.” 2 In the present [398] 
stage of research, one cannot know whether or not Brentano was influenced or not in 
elaborating this thesis by Auguste Comte. But as Brentano’s study of Auguste Comte 
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(1869) and his inaugural lecture at the University of Vienna (1874) show, this thesis is 
entirely compatible with Comte’s thinking. In addition, the mentioned works also 
show that the core of the method of natural science consists of observation and 
explanation understood as the subsumption of phenomena under general laws and 
reduction of these laws to more general laws (AC, 105). In the following I claim that 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint constitutes in an important part of it the 
result of transposing the model of explanation specific to the natural sciences in 
Auguste Comte’s scale of positive sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.) into the 
psychological domain.3 In other words, in 1874 Brentano justifies psychology’s claim 
to be a science by the fact that its program aims to explain psychological phenomena 
through empirical laws that should in turn be reduced to ultimate laws.  
 Another important thesis of my paper is that Brentano’s descriptive 
psychology is the result of emancipation of psychological research from the ideal of 
natural science. More precisely, in his Viennese period Brentano assigns to genetic 
psychology the task of establishing the laws of succession of mental phenomena, and 
he seriously doubts that genetic research will ever be able to discover ultimate 
psychological laws. For this reason, he focuses on descriptive analysis aiming at 
establishing the elements of consciousness and their connections. In this way, 
descriptive psychology represents a type of research that is independent to a great 
extent from physiological research. At the same time, it gives expression to a 
methodological particularism that preserves the idea of the unity of method with that 
of natural science, but emphasizes that the descriptive psychologist has to elaborate 
his method according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to 
the difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them.  
As regards the way this matter has been dealt with in the literature, it should 
be said that until now the relationship between empirical and descriptive psychology 
as to method has not been addressed. Although Brentano’s empirical method and the 
idea that philosophy can acquire scientific status exclusively based on this method are 
of special interest for scholars,4 there is no focused study meant to show how his 
fourth habilitation thesis develops in the two aforementioned psychological writings.  
In order to point out the significance of this thesis, we need to specify that, 
according to an early taxonomy of sciences that Brentano designed in one of the 
	
3 Comte 1830, 94; PES, 23 f. 
4 See, for instance, Haller 1988. 
	 3	
introductions of his lectures on the history of philosophy, philosophy is a natural, 
abstract science that divides in two main disciplines: natural science and mental 
science.5 [399] 
In the literature, the account that holds that mental science should use the 
method of natural science is known as methodological monism. 6  The first main 
distinction here is between the programmatic statement and the actual articulation of a 
thesis. From this standpoint, the fourth habilitation thesis may be considered as the 
expression of a general, inspired by natural science, and programmatically assumed 
monism. The thesis of this monism valid for natural science as well as for psychology 
and metaphysics is as follows: 
T0 Any science, including philosophy and psychology, has to follow the 
method of natural science, and should not be grounded on a speculative-idealistic 
principle, as is the case with the last stage of the decay of modern philosophy, the 
German idealism.7 
Based on Brentano’s works, we may highlight two ways whereby T0 was 
developed throughout his academic career: 
T1 The method of mental science is identical with the method of natural science. 
T2 The method of mental science is inspired by the method of natural science.8 
In order to prove those theses, I shall start with two hypotheses: one concerns 
the relation between empirical psychology and descriptive psychology; the other 
focuses on the different approaches to inner perception and the outcomes they 
provide. In setting forth these hypotheses, and in my whole paper, I shall repeatedly 
use the descriptive-genetic distinction outlined during Brentano’s Viennese period, 
namely, that descriptive psychology investigates the elements of consciousness and 
their way of connecting, while genetic psychology attempts to specify the conditions 
accounting for the occurrence and development of mental phenomena (DP, 3). 
The two hypotheses mentioned above are the following: 
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H1: PES constitutes an autonomous and independent project with its own 
goals and specific methods to meet them, distinct from the goals and methods of the 
descriptive psychology set forth during Brentano’s Viennese period. 
The goals of PES are the following: 
G1 Determining the characteristics according to which mental phenomena could 
be distinguished from physical phenomena. 
G2 Determining the main classes and subclasses of mental phenomena and their 
features. [400] 
G3 Determining the ultimate mental elements that underlie more complex mental 
phenomena. 
G4 Determining the laws of succession and coexistence of mental phenomena. 
G5 Reducing these laws to ultimate laws. 
As I shall show further on, the methodical steps necessary for achieving those 
goals are taken mainly from the natural sciences in Comte’s scale of positive sciences, 
which constitutes a strong argument for T1. As I have already claimed, both the goals 
and the methodical steps are mostly distinct from the goals and the methodical steps 
of descriptive psychology.  
H2: Inner perception and the results obtained through the study of it could be 
used both in the genetic account and in the descriptive account. This is the reason why 
they may be considered neutral with respect to the genetic-descriptive distinction: 
although experiencing through inner perception constitutes the first step of the method 
of descriptive psychology, we should keep in mind that inner perception also 
constitutes the main method of the 1874 empirical psychology (PES, 29; DP, 32). On 
its grounds are achieved all goals mentioned above. Moreover, Brentano’s claims 
clearly show that G1 and G2 are meant to serve that genetic goal of discovering the 
laws of succession of mental phenomena. 
 With respect to the theses whereby T0 is developed, we should specify that 
T1 is an interpretation of T0 in a narrower sense. It constitutes Brentano’s heavy 
artillery and it is applicable to the study of Auguste Comte, to PES, to his inaugural 
lecture at the University of Vienna, and to genetic psychology. Brentano had resorted 
to T1 at different stages of his early academic career, for example in his inaugural 
lecture at the University of Vienna as he clearly defines the method of positive 
science that psychology also should follow. Conversely, in his late Viennese lectures 
he had increasingly resorted to T0. It is important to emphasize that on such occasions 
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Brentano expressly wanted his audience to acknowledge him as a pioneer and a 
promoter of an anti-speculative, empirical philosophy able to provide for 
philosophical method the same accuracy and prestige that natural science was 
enjoying at the time. 
According to von Wright’s remarks, T1 is related to two other theses, both 
relevant for defining the specific character of Brentano’s early thought on the proper 
method of philosophy. 
T1' The goal of science is to explain phenomena; scientific explanation 
“consists in the subsumption of individual cases under hypothetically assumed 
general laws of nature.”9 
T1'' Physics embodies the methodological ideal of all the other sciences. 
Inspired by the ideas of Comte, in his inaugural lecture mentioned above, 
Brentano had thoroughly formulated a methodological canon of natural science that 
embodies this ideal. According to him, the following steps are required for a 
discipline to become a positive science: [401] 
NS1 Observing the phenomena and their succession. 
NS2 Determining similarities between different phenomena. 
NS3 Determining the laws, i.e., “the general and unchanging relations” 
governing the relations between phenomena. 
NS4 Explaining the phenomena, i.e., their subsumption under general laws. 
NS5 Reducing general laws to yet more general, ultimate laws (GE, 89, 95; 
AC, 105, 111). 
With respect to the second thesis, its complete expression is the following: 
T2 Although inspired by the method of natural science, the method of mental 
science is determined independently by the psychologist according to the specificity 
of the phenomena under investigation and to the difficulties that must be overcome in 
approaching them.  
Due to the fact that this thesis conceives the method to depend on the 
particularities of the object to be studied, I will call it the thesis of methodological 
particularism. In comparison with T1 that is an interpretation of T0 in a narrower 
sense, T2 constitutes a free interpretation of it and is applicable to descriptive 
psychology. While T1 assumes that the very young science of psychology follows in 
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the footsteps of the advanced mathematized science of physics, T2 addresses 
psychology in relation to sciences departing from the paradigm of physics such as 
anatomy and geognosy. In this context T2 simultaneously aims at maintaining the 
idea of grounding psychological investigations on experience and also results in 
forgoing the attempt of PES to translate the paradigm of natural science as such in the 
area of psychology. 
Since von Wright presented T1 in correlation with T1' and T1'', I will show 
that two further correlated theses can also be identified regarding T2. To this end, we 
should bear in mind the distinction between the two methodological accounts that 
Brentano had endorsed in the two stages of his academic activity in Würzburg  and 
Vienna. Although in Würzburg he designed his empirical psychology based on inner 
perception, he was still inclined to accept T1' and T1''. In contrast to this fact, which is 
a sign of a lack of a net alternative to T1' and T1'', the descriptive psychology he 
designed at the end of his Viennese period plainly allows for constructing an 
alternative. Although Brentano does not present it as such, this alternative may be 
rephrased as the two following theses: 
T2' The goal of science is not to explain, but to describe; the first stage of 
description is to distinguish the components of the mental act. 
T2'' Mental science need not follow the methodological ideal of the natural 
sciences in Comte’s scale of positive sciences. Instead it has to forge its own method. 
With respect to the relation between those three theses and the period of time 
Brentano advocated them, we need to specify the following: Brentano had endorsed 
T0 from the beginning of his scientific career until his death; as for his academic 
career, in Würzburg he ultimately and programmatically emphasized T1 and built 
[402] his PES on it; conversely, his Viennese works bear witness to T2, while T1 
continues to be tacitly valid for genetic psychology. 
In the following, I shall argue for the theses mentioned above, with reference 
especially to PES and DP. Brentano’s other writings are referred to only insofar they 






2. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and the Method of Natural 
Science 
  
PES is structured within the theoretical framework resulting from the early separation 
of philosophical disciplines into natural science and mental science. This is the reason 
why in his 1874 work, psychology is defined in thorough analogy with natural 
science: the object of both sciences is the characteristic features and the laws of 
succession and coexistence of physical and mental phenomena respectively.  
With respect to methodology, PES is the sole work where Brentano tried to 
design a psychology based on inner perception, while also working within the 
paradigm of natural science. Therefore, my claim here is that PES is designed based 
on T1 that is on the identity of method with natural science. However, we should 
notice that it is a weak kind of identity that does not require implementing all the 
specific elements of the method of natural science displayed above, but only those 
appropriate for psychology. Translated into the field of psychology, the  
methodological model of natural science is revised as follows: 
PES1 Experience one’s own mental phenomena on the basis of inner 
perception (PES, book one, ch. 2, § 2; book two, ch. 2-3). 
PES2 Determine the characteristic features of mental phenomena in 
comparison with physical phenomena (PES, book one, ch. 3, § 1; book two, 
ch. 1). 
PES3 Determine the fundamental classes of mental phenomena based on 
their natural affinities (PES, book one, ch. 3, § 2; book two, ch. 5-9). 
PES4 Investigate the most basic mental elements (sensations) out of which 
more complex phenomena arise(PES, book one, ch. 3, § 3). 
PES5 Inductively determine the general laws that rule the succession of 
mental phenomena (PES, book one, ch. 3, § 4-7;). 
PES6 Derive from them more specific laws that refer to complex mental 
phenomena (PES, book one, ch. 4, § 3).  
PES7 Inductively test those specific laws after having deduced them (PES, 
book one, ch. 4, § 3).  
PES8 Determine the ultimate psychological laws from which the general 
mental laws will be derived (PES, book one, ch. 3, § 4-7). 
In what follows, I make some remarks on PES1, 5, and 8––these three being 
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of the greatest importance for my thesis 
In contrast to natural science that can convert the outer perception of 
phenomena under its investigation into observation, psychology works with inner 
[403] perception that can never turn into observation. The reason is that any attempt 
to observe mental phenomena while experiencing them leads to their alteration – the 
attempt to observe my anger while experiencing it leads to its „settling” (PES, 30). 
However, this does not entail the impossibility of enforcing the method of natural 
science on the investigation of mental phenomena, but only that any enforcement 
should account for their specificity, that is, for the fact that mental phenomena can be 
immediately perceived only by the person experiencing them, and this specific 
perception cannot turn into observation. 
Certainly nowadays, it is common to address the second book of PES 
independently of the methodological program displayed in its first book. It is also 
common to consider the second book of PES as a prefiguration of descriptive 
psychology, for it focuses particularly on those elements that will be taken up and 
developed afterwards by descriptive psychology, namely, the characteristic features of 
mental phenomena and their main classes. But in doing so, we would overlook that 
the methodological parts of PES clearly indicate the path Brentano had in mind to 
pursue in their further development as well as the goals to be accomplished 
throughout it. As the methodological chapters of PES show, that path consists of 
various attempts to implement the methodological model of natural science within the 
area of psychology. Thus, on this account, that path does not lead to descriptive 
psychology. On the contrary, the project of PES seems to be an attempt to take up 
within the field of psychology the methodical steps of natural science. These steps 
were to be further developed on the basis of inner perception: PES2 and PES3 are 
based on investigating mental phenomena in inner perception, while PES5 is based on 
inductive generalisations of data provided by inner perception.  
Consider the following. (i) The fact that the study of mental phenomena based 
on inner perception constitutes the way the thesis on the empirical, i.e., non-
speculative grounding of natural science develops within the area of mental science 
(T0).  (ii) Most of the steps mentioned above are either borrowed from the 
methodology of natural science or adjusted to meet the specificity of mental 
phenomena.  (iii) The works of two advocates of the methodological monism, Comte 
an J. St. Mill, were an unfailing inspiration for Brentano’s analyses (PES, 12 ff., 23 f., 
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32 f., 64, 70 ff.). In view of all this it becomes clear that the project of PES is an 
autonomous project, independent of the project of descriptive psychology. It is a 
project wherein psychology is grounded on inner perception, and focuses among 
other things on defining the laws of succession of mental phenomena through 
implementing the method of the natural sciences of Comte’s scale of positive sciences 
(PES, 99).  
With respect to the descriptive-genetic distinction, this project integrates both 
investigations leading to descriptive psychology and genetic research. This is no 
surprise, for the entire third chapter of the first book is intended to analyse the 
difficulties that the research focused on discovering the laws of succession of mental 
phenomena faces. The fact that, in this chapter, determining the characteristics and the 
main classes of mental phenomena explicitly serves the discovery of the laws of 
succession of mental phenomena clearly shows the significance of genetic 
investigations for PES. In this respect, Brentano argues the following: [404] 
“The principle of the subdivision of mental phenomena will emerge from an 
account of their general characteristics; and will lead immediately to defining the 
fundamental classes of mental phenomena based on their natural affinities. Until this 
is accomplished, it will be impossible to make further progress in the investigation of 
psychological laws (…) By the same token, without having distinguished the main 
classes of mental phenomena, psychologists would endeavour in vain to establish the 
laws of their succession.” (PES, 44 f.) 
H2 above, in claiming that the outcomes of inner perception are neutral as to 
the genetic-descriptive distinction, relies precisely on this passage, whereas G1 and 
G2 of PES help to accomplish G4. In other words, someone aiming at investigating 
the correlations between mental phenomena and their physiological basis cannot 
accomplish their goal if they are unable to identify the mental phenomena under 
investigation and if they do not know their characteristics. We also should emphasise 
here that not all data grasped through inner perception can be developed in the 
descriptive account. For instance, empirical generalisations that founded the laws of 
succession of mental phenomena—e.g., the law of temporal contiguity of mental 
phenomena—are grasped through inner perception. They do not pertain to the area of 
descriptive psychology; rather, they pertain to that of genetic psychology (PES, 12).  
As for the fifth moment above, inductively determining the general 
psychological laws, we should notice that they are laws inductively obtained through 
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generalising the relations between mental phenomena grasped through inner 
perception. Although exhibiting a high level of generality, they are not the highest and 
ultimate laws as is the case with the laws of mechanics. Instead, they are empirical, 
vague, ordinarily and approximately valid laws that require further explanation. There 
are two reasons for the precarious status of those laws: the difficulty of their 
mathematisation and the early stage of development of physiology that makes it 
impossible to know those physiological conditions of the course of mental life on 
which the latter is fundamentally dependent. Thus, the empirical generalisations the 
psychologist uses are valid under the assumption of a regular, constant course of the 
physiological processes of the brain. Any deviation from the regular course, due for 
instance to substance use (e.g., alcohol) or to pathological anomalies, will lead to 
adjustments in the law correlations ascertained through inner perception and to a 
decreased generality due to defining the limits of their validity (PES, 47, 62 f.). 
The account of psychological laws that Brentano repeatedly focuses on aims 
precisely at addressing the physiological conditions of mental life. Although he does 
not state it explicitly, he aims at two types of succession of mental phenomena: their 
immediate succession (for instance, Mill’s Law of Contiguity of mental phenomena) 
and their succession after a certain period of time (the phenomenon of habitual 
dispositions) (PES, 47 f., 59 ff.). In the first case, the account of the succession of 
mental phenomena would consist of a more thorough designation of the immediate 
physiological preconditions or concomitant conditions of their succession excluding 
any physiological element that is not immediately connected to them in that process. 
In the second case, the account would consist of indicating the purely physiological 
processes that have occurred in the brain in the time frame up to the emergence of 
[405] the mental phenomenon that produces the habitual disposition. The focus here 
is, as Brentano emphasises, on those phenomena that convey the metabolic processes 
of the brain significant for the phenomenon of habitual disposition. If we would have 
this information, then:  
 
“we would be in possession of fundamental psychological laws that, while 
they would certainly be less transparently clear, would nonetheless possess the same 
rigorousness and accuracy as the axioms of mathematics—the highest psychological 
laws that could be treated as ultimate laws in the narrower sense of the word. The 
laws that constitute our highest laws at the moment would, however, reappear to some 
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extent in an altered form as derivative laws, and a great deal, if not the whole of 
psychology would acquire a half-physiological, half-psychological character.” (PES, 
48) 
 
Unlike the paper on Comte and the inaugural lecture at the University of 
Vienna, where Brentano had focused on explanation as a subsumption of phenomena 
under general laws, both the text mentioned above and the analyses from the last two 
chapters of the first book of PES focus on explanation as reduction of general laws to 
yet more general laws. This fact shows that, for Brentano, the issue that psychology 
had to deal with at that time was not the lack of general laws designed to explain the 
succession of mental phenomena. Instead, the issue concerned the lack of ultimate 
psychological laws capable of resolving fundamental disputes in psychological 
research. 
As the Subjunctive Mood used by Brentano in the passage quoted above 
clearly shows, finding such ultimate laws constitutes a mere theoretical possibility 
that, although achievable in principle, is still far from being successfully 
accomplished. On the other hand, this fact should not prevent us from noticing that, 
though brief, the passage shows PES operates on the assumption that at some point 
physiology will be so advanced that it could provide the necessary knowledge for 
determining the type of ultimate psychological laws mentioned. From those laws one 
could derive the general laws of the succession of mental phenomena, laws hitherto 
inductively determined by generalising the data provided through inner perception.  
From this viewpoint, we could surmise that in PES Brentano had drawn broadly the 
outlines of a future empirical-genetic psychology that shares the method of the natural 
sciences in Comte’s scale.10 Unlike the 1874 psychology that had managed to absorb 
only the first four levels of the methodological model of natural science, this future 
psychology would succeed in absorbing also its last stage that is reducing the laws 
determined through empirical generalisation to ultimate psychological laws. 
In this context, it is worth commenting with respect to genetic investigations 
in PES that although Brentano explicitly acknowledged the significance of 
conditioning mental activity upon physiological activity, there are plenty of claims in 
	
10 In his lecture on psychology held at the University of Prague since 1880−1, Anton Marty also dealt 
with this topic, because the second part of his lectures is exactly about the genetic psychology (see 
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PES that show that, for him, the investigation of mental phenomena on the basis of 
inner [406] perception is more significant than the attempt to discover through a 
psychophysical approach the ultimate laws of consciousness. The fact that it is 
possible to highlight two different accounts of mental phenomena within PES 
constitutes a strong argument for this idea. The first account—designated, for reasons 
that will be subsequently clarified, as the continuity account of different classes of 
phenomena—puts mental phenomena in the framework of Auguste Comte’s theory of 
the hierarchy of phenomena. This hierarchy emphasises the continuity of various 
classes of phenomena in keeping with the genetic approach. The second account, 
never mentioned before in the exegetics, confines continuity to those phenomena 
preceding mental phenomena, precisely in order to emphasise their radical 
discontinuity and heterogeneity with respect to all previous phenomena as they are 
distinguished by Comte.  
With respect to the first account, the continuity account, Brentano’s starting 
point is Auguste Comte’s claim that there is a hierarchy of phenomena that constantly 
grows in complexity (mathematical, astronomical, physical, chemical, biological, and 
social phenomena) and a corresponding scale of sciences. The constitutive principle 
for this hierarchy is that every new class of phenomena represents a development of 
previous phenomena with new elements and new conditions for their correlations. 
Although it is obvious that every new class of phenomena is irreducible to previous 
classes, for each has its own laws, the focus of this account is squarely on the idea of 
continuous growth in the complexity of the phenomena. In accordance with the 
hierarchy of phenomena, each superior science would be able to fulfil its task only 
after the establishment of the science that investigates previous phenomena (physics 
after mathematics, chemistry after physics, etc.).11 This means, with respect to the 
relations between the last sciences in the scale, that younger sciences would reach 
their positive level, i.e., the level of enforcing the method of natural science, only 
after previous sciences in the scale had already reached their mature level. We should 
notice here that Brentano makes significant changes in Comte’s scale. Those 
particular changes are sociology substituted for psychology and psychology 
considered as fundamental to it (PES, 23 f.). Such changes are made precisely to 
	
11 Comte 1830, 86 ff., 96 f., 111 ff.; see also PES, XXVIII, 23 f.  
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justify the investigations in PES. Brentano’s following claim is highly relevant for 
this account that emphasises the continuity of mental phenomena:  
 
“Just as physical phenomena are under the influence of mathematical laws, 
and chemical phenomena are under the influence of physical laws (…) so 
psychological phenomena are influenced by the laws governing the forces which 
shape and renew the bodily organs involved.” (PES, 17 f.) 
 
Let us now compare this quotation to the following quote from the third 
chapter of the same book:  
 
„But the result of a more careful comparison and an analysis of all pertinent 
facts certainly seems to us to prove that much more information about physiological 
phenomena is to be expected from chemical phenomena than from physiological 
phenomena about mental phenomena. The difference between [407] physiological 
processes and chemical and physical processes really seems to be only that 
physiological processes are more complex. [...] We can hardly say the same thing of 
the concept of life when we apply it to the physiological and psychical realms. On the 
contrary, if we turn our attention from the external world to the inner, we find 
ourselves, as it were, in a new realm. The phenomena are absolutely heterogeneous, 
and even analogies either forsake us completely or take on a very vague and artificial 
character. It was for this very reason that we separated mental and physical sciences 
as the main branches of empirical science in our earlier discussion of the fundamental 
divisions of that realm.” (PES, 50 f.) 
 
The quotation clearly shows that the word ‘life’ means fundamentally 
different things with respect to psychology and physiology, and that Brentano firmly 
holds the irreducibility of mental phenomena with respect to all the other phenomena 
by Comte. Both this account, and the continuity account belong to a work that is 
closely linked to the thesis that there is no other way for psychology to become a 
science than to use the methodical steps of the natural sciences of Comte’s scale of 
sciences. As I shall show below, in his Viennese period Brentano came to the idea 
that there is another way for psychology, and that this way is quite diffrent from the 
way of positive sciences in Comte.  
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3. Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology and the Ideal of Natural Science 
 
By the end of his Viennese period, Brentano had given three lectures on descriptive 
psychology: Deskriptive Psychologie (1887–8), Deskriptive Psychologie oder 
beschreibende Phänomenologie (1888–9), and Psychognosie (1890–1). The last one 
underlies DP.12  
Broadly speaking, the main change in Brentano’s account on psychology as 
science during this time consists of his reaching the view that causal-explanatory 
science is not the only way for psychology to become a science. Furthermore, 
Brentano highlights a descriptive paradigm of science, i.e. descriptive psychology. 
This approach no longer aims at explaining the laws of succession of the phenomena, 
but at highlighting the elements of consciousness and their relations. Thus, we may 
say that in his Viennese period Brentano had discovered an alternative way for 
psychology to become a science than the one he endorsed in PES. PES gathered 
investigations dedicated to the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, 
investigations devoted to determining the main classes of mental phenomena, and 
genetic investigations that, due to the development of contemporary physiology, 
could not provide conclusive results in the foreseeable future. By contrast, in DP 
Brentano manages to define the task of descriptive psychology so that it is plainly 
[408] distinguished from genetic investigations, and therefore it is no longer 
dependent on the development of physiology, as was the case in his 1874 empirical 
psychology. 
I shall turn now to the genetic-descriptive distinction in regard to its relevance 
for the issue of methodological monism. In this respect, I shall refer first to genetic 
psychology since, on the one hand, genetic investigations played a major role within 
PES in transplanting the method of natural science to psychology. On the other hand, 
they continue to be the area of application of this method during Brentano’s Viennese 
period. 
Unlike PES, which was founded on the idea of a single, identical method for 
both natural and mental sciences, DP holds this idea only with respect to genetic 
psychology. As for descriptive psychology, it is set in the spirit of T2. In this respect, 
	
12 Baumgartner, Chisholm, Müller 1995, p. XVI; DP also contains fragments from his other lectures 
and some of his papers on descriptive psychology from around 1900. 
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in a piece from 1901, Brentano clearly argues in favour of methodological 
particularism:  
 
“3. The method. 
 In general it is the method of natural science based on experience. But this is 
not saying much. Think of how different the methods of the different branches of 
natural science are! Each one must take into account the particularity and the 
particular difficulties of the subject.” (DP, 163) 
 
In the work of 1874, due to the transplanting of the program of natural 
science, Brentano focused on highlighting the correlations between the laws of 
succession of mental phenomena and the changes happening at the level of their 
physiological basis. But in his accounts of genetic psychology during his Viennese 
period, he focuses not on a psychophysical explanation of the laws of succession but 
on investigating the circumstances that cause the occurrence of mental phenomena. 
This task of genetic psychology is justified by his explicit acknowledgment of the 
importance of genetic investigations for descriptive psychology (DP, 3 f., 8 f.). In 
addition to this, Brentano changes his view on genetic psychology during his 
Viennese period: one of the main reasons why he could substitute sociology for 
psychology in Comte’s scale of sciences in 1874 was that psychology and natural 
science had a common goal: to determine the laws of succession of the phenomena 
and explain them through the reduction to yet more general laws. This goal played a 
key role in accounting for psychology within Comte’s scale, for thereby psychology 
naturally pursued the positive program of other sciences. In this respect, during his 
Viennese period, Brentano’s view changes radically for the following reasons.  
First, unlike PES wherein Brentano trusted that sometime in the future 
physiological investigation along with genetic investigation would be so developed 
that they could provide the necessary information to reduce the empirical laws of the 
mental to ultimate psychological laws, during his Viennese period he loses confidence 
in the possibility of accomplishing this goal. According to him, genetic psychology 
will presumably have to permanently give up any claim to exactness (DP, 6 f.). More 
explicitly, despite its affinity to the other sciences within Comte’s scale, genetic 
psychology is not a science that is called to achieve the ideal of exactness already 
accomplished in sciences such as mathematics and physics. Therefore, it is not 
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through the development of physiology and psychological investigations that 
psychology will acquire the same status as the two sciences mentioned above. Rather, 
the application of methodological particularism, i.e., through the drawing of [409] its 
own method, will enable psychology, more precisely descriptive psychology, to 
determine laws as exact as the laws of mathematics (DP, 5 f.). In other words, there is 
another way for a discipline to become a science than the way of natural science in 
Comte’s scale (physics, biology etc.). This is the way of descriptive psychology. 
Second, as for the two accounts of mental phenomena displayed in PES that 
we have highlighted above—i.e., approaching mental phenomena from the standpoint 
of their continuity with respect to previous phenomena in Comte’s hierarchy and 
approaching them independently, as a radically different class from them—in DP the 
first is overlooked and implicitly set aside along with its genetic investigations. 
These observations show that in his Viennese period Brentano takes a critical 
look at his previous idea that psychology can accomplish the methodological ideal of 
natural science. Unlike PES where he accepts the possibility that the psychological-
genetic researches could reach the ultimate stage of the ideal of natural science (i.e., 
discovering the ultimate psychological laws), in his Viennese period he does not 
discuss this idea anymore, but emphasizes constantly the difficulties of genetic 
psychology: the approximate character of its laws, the fact that they have numerous 
exceptions, etc. (DP, 5). These statements are fully consistent with those made in a 
lecture on the future of philosophy in 1893. There Brentano takes a position against 
the unilateralism of Adolf Exner, who considered that science has to operate 
according to the model of natural science. For Brentano the scientist should not be 
guided by normative claims that are hard or impossible to satisfy. On the contrary, in 
the spirit of the above-mentioned methodological particularism, he recommends the 
approach by direct induction and the use of those steps in the methodical model of 
natural science suitable to the level of development of each science. From this 
viewpoint it is important to notice that Brentano illustrates his thesis with references 
to sciences such as meteorology, physiology, zoology, i.e., sciences in the incipient 
stages of their development.13 For this reason, his statements on genetic psychology in 
DP can be interpreted as evidence that Brentano abandoned the idea of constituting a 
psychology according to the model used in 1874.  
	
13 Brentano 1893, 32 ff. 
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As regards descriptive psychology, I shall not delve further into an analysis of 
Brentano’s mereology specific to this work, for this topic has been thoroughly 
addressed in the literature.14 Instead, I shall focus on the particular methodological 
aspects that are relevant to the issue I examine here. 
Unlike PES, wherein the task of an investigation grounded in inner experience 
consisted of determining the characteristics and the laws of mental phenomena, DP 
focuses on determining the elements of mental life and their connections. Brentano’s 
notion of element enables a consistent description of mental life, for it reduces mental 
acts and their features to a common denominator: while the former are actually 
separable elements (the mental acts), the latter are merely distinct, separable elements 
(distinctional parts in the proper sense and in the improper sense) (DP, 15-31). This 
conceptual toolkit made through systematising various types of [410] distinctions, is 
meant to exhaustively separate different kinds of parts of consciousness and their 
connections as necessary when investigating any mental phenomenon. There are no 
elements of consciousness, nor connections other than those Brentano included in his 
mereological inventory. There is also no mental state, no matter how complex, that 
would not be fully described by this inventory. Unlike T1' in PES that held that 
science aims at explaining the phenomena, its descriptive alternative that Brentano 
frames in DP holds that science aims to describe, as distinct from explaining, the 
phenomena. That is to say, according to Brentano psychology could become a science 
in his day only if it confined itself to describing mental states. 
The method whereby Brentano attempts to accomplish his descriptive goals 
and that constitutes his methodological particularism consists of the following stages: 
experiencing, noticing, fixing, inductive generalisation and making deductive use. 
Compared to the methodological model of natural science employed in 1874, the 
originality of his new model is identifiable in its intermediate steps. I shall now focus 
on the second and the fourth steps because they especially highlight how a science 
like descriptive psychology works. 
With respect to the second step, is worth noting that it plays the most 
significant part within the methodological particularism of DP. Brentano’s special 
focus on it is due to the difficulties specific to inner perception: in inner perception 
complex mental states and their parts are diffusely registered (DP, 34). The role of 
	
14 See, for example, Chisholm 1967, Mulligan and Smith 1984/84, Marek 1989, Albertazzi 2006, 131-
143. 
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noticing is to distinguish those parts. The objective of Brentano’s mereological toolkit 
is to warrant the fact that a description is complete—i.e., there are no other types of 
parts of mental acts than those listed in it. In other words, there are no other parts of 
mental acts that cannot be detected by whoever is using this toolkit. If used for the 
investigation of mental life, both separable parts and distinctional parts show, each of 
them, the outcomes achieved by clarifying the implicit parts of a mental phenomenon 
inwardly perceived. Unlike PES, which solely highlighted the general characteristics 
of mental phenomena and their main classes, the psychognost is able to describe and 
analyse mental life far more accurately due to this methodological stage and its 
corresponding toolkit (DP, 36). If we take into account that the subsequent 
methodological stages of descriptive psychology also use the data provided by 
noticing, then we may consider it as the main step in building up descriptive 
psychology as science. 
With respect to the moment of inductive generalisation, Brentano shows in DP 
that there is yet another way to arrive at general laws than the inductive generalisation 
of the relations registered through inner perception. There are laws manifested 
through concepts and that express certain ideal correlations. These correlations are 
intuitively grasped, and they show the connections specific to certain concepts—e.g.,  
“every point in a phenomenal space is of a specific spatial species” (DP, 76). Or, they 
show the fact that there are no other characteristics than those intrinsic to the 
concept—e.g., “that there is no third quality apart from affirmation and negation” 
with respect to judgment (DP, 71 f.). These laws admit no exceptions, and they may 
be stated as sharply and precisely as the laws of mathematics (DP, 5). Thanks to them, 
psychology is considered an exact science with the same status as mathematics. 
However, in DP, Brentano no longer reconciles descriptive psychology to Comte’s 
scale of positive sciences. Instead, he associates it with sciences such as [411] 
anatomy and geognosy (DP, 8). Like descriptive psychology, they also deal with 
elements and their connections that are specific to their respective areas. 
Similar to PES, DP is also grounded on experience. However, unlike the 1874 
work, this foundation no longer pursues the path of the natural sciences of Comte’s 
scale. Instead it follows the way of methodological particularism and freely develops 
its own method depending on the difficulties to be overcome and on the tools required 
to address them provided by the philosophical tradition. In this respect, we may say 
that the method of descriptive psychology is no longer the method of natural science 
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but a method solely inspired by it. On the other hand, if we consider the confident 
approach in DP, we may say that descriptive psychology did not have to go through 
childhood, as was the case for genetic psychology due to its dependence on 
physiology: in other words, it was born already mature. Accidentally or not, once the 
fact that psychology may acquire the status of a mature science solely as descriptive 
psychology was clarified, in his conferences on the method of philosophy from his 
last years at the University of Vienna, Brentano conceived his statements on the 
method of philosophy more loosely.  He no longer referred to transplanting the 
method of mature natural sciences like physics to psychology. His focus, instead, was 
on various formulations of the general methodological monism displayed in T0, 
maintaining that both philosophy and psychology should be grounded on induction 
and experience.15 
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